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Despite the increasing use by charities, significant uncertainty exists about optimal online fundraising
mechanisms, especially when large donor pools show substantial heterogeneities. We use an online
natural field experiment with over 700,000 subjects to test theory on price discounts and show large
differences in donation behavior between donors who have previously given money and/or volunteered.
For example, framing the charity’s membership price as a discount increases response rates and decreases
conditional contributions from former volunteers, but not from past money donors. Our study thereby
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The year 2007 marked the first time that more than $300 billion were donated to charity 
with individual donations accounting for more than 80% of this total (Giving USA, 2008).  To 
solicit these donations, charities are aggressively turning to the internet due to its low marginal 
cost of use and rapid implementation time
1 (COP, 2008). However, there remains significant 
uncertainty within the fundraising community as to which rules from offline fundraising translate 
online and how to incorporate new features enabled by the internet into the charity’s optimal 
fundraising strategy.  Recent empirical publications on the determinants of giving have studied 
mail, phone, and door-to-door solicitation.
2  There are almost no studies, however, that consider 
the internet as a means of solicitation.
3  For economists, the internet provides a unique 
opportunity to actively contribute to a rapidly growing industry using field experiments that can 
be easily, inexpensively, and identically implemented across large populations.  As such, in this 
paper we conduct a natural field experiment with a sample of over 700,000 subjects, including 
donors and volunteers, to better understand the role of discounts and memberships in charitable 
fundraising.  
Fundraisers generally believe that an individual who has donated money in the past, 
regardless the amount, is much more likely to donate money in the future.  This effect, 
commonly called the “warm list” effect, has been recently discussed in the empirical literature 
with respect to offline donations (Landry et al. 2008).  There is much less known, however, 
about anticipated money donations from those who have volunteered in the past, i.e., donated 
time.  One unique feature of the internet is the ease with which charities can solicit and use 
individual time donations to accomplish their legislative, policy or other communication 
objectives.  While it might be expected that past volunteers are also more likely to donate money 
in the future, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this topic is unstudied in the empirical or 
experimental economics literature. 
                                                      
1  Notably, Barack Obama raised roughly $450 million dollars during his 2008 Presidential campaign with a large 
fraction of that coming online.  In January 2008, the Obama campaign raised $32 million total with $28 million 
coming from online sources. 
2  For example, Falk (2007) uses postal mailings, Shang and Croson (2006) use phone solicitation, while Landry et 
al. (2006) employ a door-to-door strategy.  
3 Chen et al. (2006) is a notable exception. They conduct an online experiment soliciting visitors to a charity’s 
website using a pop-up. This experiment yielded 24 donors who contributed a total of $1,128. Here we actively 
solicit potential donors via email instead of passively waiting for them to visit a particular website. 
- 1 - Understanding how donation dimension affects the propensity to give, charities can 
optimize their solicitation appeals by targeting different donor types with specific mechanisms. 
We therefore define an “augmented warm list” which includes both the magnitude and the 
dimension of past donations.  We demonstrate its beneficial use for targeted fundraising using 
the example of different pricing schemes for membership offers. In particular, we study the role 
of price discounts.  
The analysis of linking donations with charitable memberships represents a unique 
contribution to the economic literature and complements a rich literature that links public good 
contributions with private benefits (see e.g., Cornes and Sandler, 1984).  Andreoni (1989, 1990) 
introduced a model of impure altruism to the public goods model where donors receive some 
extra utility (i.e., warm glow) from their donations.  Building on this, the recent economic 
literature considers a variety of specific private incentives to motivate contributions to public 
goods.
4  For example, gifts may lead to increased donations if they trigger reciprocity from the 
potential donors, or if their receipt is conditioned on donations exceeding a certain threshold, 
gifts may induce agents to contribute in order to obtain (or buy) the offered good.  The ideal gift 
or conditional good would be one that  (i) has no or low costs to the charity,
5 (ii) is difficult to 
obtain without making a contribution to the charity; (iii) has a high consumption value for the 
agent such that, if charged, agents are willing to pay a high price, (iv) triggers a large increase in 
warm-glow or reciprocity.  Charitable membership and its associated benefits, potentially meet 
all of these criteria.   
The use of price discounts has been well-studied in the marketing literature with respect 
to for-profit applications (e.g., Thaler 1985; Blattberg and Neslin 1989; Folkes and Wheat 1995, 
Gupta and Cooper 1992, Crewal et al. 1998).  Discounts are observed to work via different 
mechanisms: (i) announcing the undiscounted higher price may serve as a quality signal and thus 
                                                      
4 Morgan (2000), Morgan and Sefton (2000), Landry et al. (2006), Lange et al. (2007) show the potential welfare-
enhancing effects from introducing fixed-price lotteries to charitable fundraising. Falk (2007) and Landry et al. 
(2008) consider the role of gifts in triggering increased donations.   
5 This includes opportunity costs: even if goods are donated to the charity, the nonprofit might have alternative ways 
to sell the good and thereby to generate income to the charity. In order to be beneficial to the charity, the good must 
induce increases in giving in excess of those opportunity costs. Vesterlund (2003) discusses an additional 
mechanism by which this may occur: seed money or goods and prices which are donated to the charity may serve as 
a signal to subsequent donors about the quality of the charity. 
- 2 - may enhance demand;
6 (ii) offering the discounts may create some perception of savings; (iii) 
lowering the price may increase demand due to a downward sloping demand curve. The first two 
mechanisms are primarily short run in nature because consumers are expected to update their 
beliefs and reference-points.
7  The authors were unable to identify, however, any peer-reviewed 
literature that connects discounts with charitable giving or charitable memberships despite the 
increased use of these two mechanisms by charities. 
Returning to our initial premise, we combine these two mechanisms to determine the 
effect of offering the charitable membership with and without a price discount on 1) response 
rate (i.e., growth of the warm list) and 2) profitability (i.e., total dollars raised).  We do this by 
making identical membership offers to two treatment groups except that one group must make a 
donation of at least $35 to receive the membership and the second need only make a donation of 
at least $25 which was said to represent “a special $10 discount” from the standard membership 
level.  The literature suggests that there may be price effects related to the private benefits from 
donations.  Harbaugh (1998) shows the potential benefits from selling reputation signals at 
different price points and Landry et al. (2008) consider gifts that are only given if donations 
exceed a minimum donation threshold.  To disentangle the effect of the discount from possible 
unrelated price effects, we include a third treatment group that is offered an identical 
membership for a minimum donation of $25 without the mention of the special discount.  We 
also develop a theoretical model in Section II that allows us to derive hypotheses as to the 
results. 
Our online field experiment was conducted on an unprecedented scale and raised a total 
of $77,026 from 1,691 donors.  Framing a $25 threshold price to become a member as a special 
discount from a standard $35 level induces a significantly larger proportion of people to donate 
and become members without reducing the total dollars raised.  Thus the discount increased the 
size of the charity’s warm list without compromising profitability.  Without the discount 
framing, we find that $25 and $35 minimum donation levels for a membership induce a similar 
proportion of people to donate; however, the overall donation amount was 17% less with the 
                                                      
6 Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Bagwell and Riordan (1991) discuss prices as quality signals.  
7 That is, in the short run unexpected price discounts may provide demand boosts due to reference-dependent 
preferences (e.g., Heidhus and Köszegi 2008), while in the long-run these effects might be smaller as the quality 
signal may be diluted by continuous price discounts (Folkes and Wheat 1995, Gupta and Cooper 1992,), and 
references may shift (Köszegi and Rabin 2006). 
- 3 - lower membership threshold.  Interestingly, this price effect suggests that a charity could 
therefore exploit the relatively inelastic demand for membership by requiring a larger minimum 
contribution to receive membership benefits.  These results conform to our theory. 
This is not, however, the entire story.  We believe that our study is the first to explicitly 
consider the interaction between fundraising mechanism and mode of previous contributions to 
the charity. Volunteering or the donation of time accounts for roughly 55% of total giving in the 
United States (Salamon et al. 2007) to combine with financial contributions to represent 5.1% of 
US GDP.  Using a complete history of the treatment pool’s online contributions of time and 
money to the charity, we analyze the heterogeneity of response with respect to the above 
treatments.  We show that previous time and money donors respond to the discount treatment 
quite differently.  Past financial donors contribute at a conditional level consistent with the 
undiscounted $35 minimum membership threshold; whereas, past time donors contribute at a 
conditional level consistent with the undiscounted $25 minimum membership threshold.  Those 
who have only given money in the past donate at an unconditional level that is higher than the 
undiscounted $35 threshold; those who have given both money and time donate at an 
unconditional level equal to the $25 threshold.  These differences within the discount treatment 
do not appear when presented with the $25 minimum threshold without the discount.  This 
demonstrates differences in the perception of charitable discounts by past time or money donors.  
Furthermore, it demonstrates the importance of studying the effectiveness of charity fundraising 
mechanisms along different modes of giving.  
The remainder of our study proceeds as follows.  The next section provides the 
theoretical framework, which illustrates behavioral motivations for giving. Section III introduces 
our field experimental design.  Section IV describes our findings and we conclude in Section V. 
 
II. Theoretical Model 
We provide a simple model to illustrate the most important determinants of giving 
behavior. We use a variant of Andreoni’s (1989, 1990) impure altruism model and include 
consumption utility from a private good which in this case is the membership in the organization.  
- 4 - Agent   receives utility from consuming a numeraire good,  i∈Ω i y , a private good 
(membership) at expected value  , a public good provided at level G , and (possibly) some 
extra utility (warm-glow) 
i m
( ) ii f g  from her own contribution to the public good  .  Agents might 
also perceive the membership as a gift from the organization, depending on the way the 
membership is offered (e.g., with a discount).  We model the resulting reciprocity component of 
utility as a function of both the contribution level and the perceived consumption value of the 
membership:  . Importantly, the extent to which membership offers trigger reciprocal 
actions might depend on the historical interaction between donors and organization as will be 
described below. 
i g
( , ii rg ) i m
Assuming additive separability of these different utility components, agent i’s utility 
facing a budget constraint  ii i y gw +≤ and receiving expected membership benefits   is 
defined as:  
i m
(, ) ( ) () (, ) iii i i i ii i ii iii Ugm w g m hg G fg rgm − =−++ + + +      (1) 
where   and  () • i h () • i f  are twice continuously differentiable, non-decreasing and concave, and 
,  , and 
2
i ∂∂
2 /0 rg ≤
2 /0 m ∂ ≥ i rg ∂∂ i ji G − ≠ = j g ∑ . The optimal solution to maximizing (1) for a 
given   is denoted by  .  The assumptions ensure that  i m ˆ ( ii gm ) ˆ () / 0 ii i gm m ∂ ∂≥ .  
We assume that the membership is awarded if contributions exceed a threshold  . 
Taking this threshold into account, the agent’s optimal contribution level is denoted by 
. This optimal contribution may fall into three regions: (I) the threshold is not binding 
and the agent chooses to contribute at a higher level ( ), (II) the minimum donation 
threshold is binding and the agent contributes at the threshold, (III) the agent is not willing to 
contribute at the threshold level and therefore does not receive membership benefits.  The 
agent’s willingness-to-pay for the membership is then given by: 
T
*(, ) ii gm T
ˆ () ii gm
{ } ˆ ()m a x | (,) (( 0 ) , 0 )
ii
ii i ii i WTP m g U g m U g =≥    (2) 
- 5 - Note that  . We can now formally state the optimal donation when 
offering a membership of quality   at a threshold of T : 
ˆ () () ii ii WTP m g m ≥
i m
   (3) 
*
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We illustrate the effect of the threshold level T  on contributions   in Figure 1 
for a representative individual.  If the threshold level is below the contribution level  , a 
marginal increase in T  naturally has no effect (Region I). In Region II, the threshold exceeds the 
unconditional contribution level, but falls short of the willingness-to-pay such that the agent 
decides to contribute exactly the minimum donation level.  If T  exceeds the willingness-to-pay 
(Region III), contributions fall to the voluntary contribution level without being a member 
( ) which may be zero.  
*(, ) ii gm T
ˆ () ii gm
ˆ (0) i g
For a given perceived membership value  , we would therefore expect the number of 
donors (i.e., response rate) to be downward sloping in the required minimum donation level 
(price effect).  The impact of this price effect on average conditional contributions, however, is 
less clear: (i) donors whose WTP now is less than the threshold T  may still contribute (if 
), but at a lower level; (ii) other subjects whose WTP still is larger than the required 
threshold increase their contributions in order to obtain the membership.  
i m
ˆ (0) 0 > i g
In addition to this price effect, the threshold price for membership may serve as a quality 
signal.  This link between prices and perceived product quality has been established in several 
economic studies (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Bagwell and Riordan 1991; Gerstner 1985).  
We therefore assume that the expected value of membership benefits to the individual will 
depend on the announcement of the threshold (T ): ( ) 0 ii mM T = > .
8 
A higher (expected) quality of membership may increase donations via two distinct 
channels: it may trigger increased donations via the reciprocity term of equation (1) as   is  ˆ () ii gm
                                                      
8 Similarly, treatment relevant information like the announcement of a threshold for the membership might influence 
the perceived quality of the charity and thereby the utility from the public good or from the own contributions. To 
simplify the presentation, we abstain from modeling those effects explicitly.  
- 6 - non-decreasing in   ( quality-reciprocity effect). i m
T
) i m >
9 Furthermore, a higher (expected) quality 
increases the consumption value   of the membership and therefore the willingness-to-pay to 





With our experimental design we attempt to provide insights into the price and quality 
effects. For this we will compare donations at a high threshold level ( ) with 
those at a reduced threshold level ( ), as well as consider a discount treatment 














When comparing individual contributions at a high vs. a low threshold level, i.e.  
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the quality effect and the price effect interact (see Figure 1).  An increased threshold 
( mM ) increases  (
high
ii T ′ ≡ ˆ ) i ′  and may also increase the willingness-to-pay ( 2 T′).  As a 
result, the higher threshold generates larger contributions for subjects contributing above the 
threshold (quality-reciprocity effect), or at the threshold (price effect or quality-consumption 
effect). A negative net effect might prevail if the threshold   exceeds the corresponding 
willingness-to-pay for membership. (i.e., if T  becomes so high that the charity moves into 
Region III of Figure 1 for a large fraction of the potential donors despite the possible shifting of 
Region III to the right).  These predictions are summarized in Hypothesis 1: 
high T
Hypothesis 1: Due to the interaction of quality and price effect, an increase in the minimum 
donation level (threshold) required for membership has an ambiguous effect on the number of 
donors and conditional contributions.  Conditional on contributing above the threshold, 
conditional contributions increase in the minimum donation level  if this minimum level 
provides a quality signal.  
We now turn to the role of discounts and compare the contribution level where the lower 
threshold ( ) is framed as a discount   to the contribution level without the 
discount  .  The former should result in a higher participation rate as more 
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9 Falk (2007) shows a positive correlation between the size of a gift and the response rate. 
- 7 - ambiguous as some agents may move down along the threshold if a discount is offered (stay 
within Region II in Figure 1)), while others start contributing at the (lower) threshold level 
(move from Region III into Region II). 
A similar effect occurs when a price   is announced as a price discount from  : 
that is   vs.  .  The increased quality may induce more 
people to be willing to pay the minimum contribution level such that participation should 
increase. The effect on individual contributions is predicted to be positive, while the conditional 
contributions are ambiguous as newly entering agents may drive down the average.  We 











Hypothesis 2: Formulating a minimum contribution level for membership as a price discount 
from a standard higher level increases participation compared to the higher threshold (due to 
price effect), but also compared to a lower threshold not announced as a discount (due to 
quality effect). The effect on conditional contribution levels is ambiguous.   
Complementary to these main treatment effects which are the focus of the current study, 
we are interested in the heterogeneous treatment affects based on certain donor characteristics. 
We use the remainder of this section to discuss additional predictions based on donor specifics. 
 
Heterogeneity of the donor pool – Money vs. time donors 
While much of the fundraising literature focuses on financial contributions, donors are 
also often requested to contribute time.  In the following, we discuss how previous money or 
time donors may differ in their reaction to a (money) fundraising attempt.   
Subjects who make money or time contributions in the past should be more likely to give 
than non-donors as their valuation of the public good ( '( ) i h • ) and/or their warm glow from 
giving is larger ( ). This effect is well-known in the fundraising literature as a reason to 
value warm-lists.
'( ) i f •
10  Subjects who previously donated money might also be anchored by their 
previous donation such that their reaction to price changes is less elastic. For example, a donor 
                                                      
10 Landry et al. (2008) identify warm-list benefits in a field experimental setting. They show that the warm-list value 
depends on how donors are solicited: warm list value is significant when charities ask for voluntary contributions, 
but is reduced when additional gifts/incentives are offered to induce contributions.  
- 8 - who always contributed $40 in response to donation requests might not change her contributions 
if membership benefits are given at $25 or $35; whereas, a donor who has never donated money 
in the past is not anchored by their first gift. As such, past money and time donors may differ in 
their reaction to manipulations in the price required for membership benefits. In terms of our 
model, previous money donors may be more likely to have  .  Similar differences 
between subjects may occur with respect to the price effect when framing a lower threshold as a 




Price discounts might, however, also work through the reciprocity channel. That is, the 
discount might be interpreted as a nice offer from the charity such that an individual agent might 
reciprocate gifts by increasing donations. In aggregate, this could result in a higher response rate 
and in larger conditional donations. This type of reciprocal gift exchange has been demonstrated 
in the field (e.g. giving post cards in exchange for money donations as in Falk (2007)) as well as 
in the lab (gift exchange game).  
If the interaction between donors and the charity is repeated, however, actions by the 
charity may also be interpreted as a reaction to past donor behavior. That is, a price discount 
could potentially also be seen as a “thank you” by past donors. As such, a discount may trigger 
less reciprocal action among previous donors than non-donors.  We argue that this “thank you” 
effect is also more likely to occur for previous time donors than for those who previously gave 
money.  As argued above, donations from money donors may react less elastically to price 
changes. Furthermore, giving a money discount as a “thank-you” for a money donation may seem 
illogical to money donors who view the donor/charity relationship as one of raising money.  
Conversely, past time donors might be expected to interpret the discount as an indication of 
value placed on their time-donations by the charity and thus a reasonable “thank-you” for 
volunteering.  Consequently, price discounts may trigger a stronger reciprocity reaction from 
past money donors and “thank-you” reaction from past time donors.  We therefore formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Former time donors are more likely to reduce their conditional contributions as 
a reaction to price discounts than past non-donors and former money donors are.  
With the establishment of these hypotheses, we now turn to the experiment design and 
results. 
- 9 -  
III Experimental Design 
Following our theory, we designed a large scale natural field experiment with the goal of 
understanding how discounting a charitable membership affects the response rate, the 
unconditional donation level and the conditional donation level.  The study was conducted online 
with 702,890 individuals.  In addition to the experimental data, we obtained information on 
previous time and money donations from the individuals to the charitable organization.  
The charitable organization is a large left-leaning advocacy organization that fights for 
civil liberties in the United States.  The organization qualifies as a 501c(4) under IRS tax code 
which means donations to the organization cannot be deducted from income for federal tax 
purposes.  It possesses an online email list with more than 1 million subscribers.  This list serves 
as the basis for all of the organization’s online fundraising efforts as well as other 
communications between the charitable organization and the individual. 
Our experimental pool consisted of the 702,890 individuals who have not been a member 
of the charitable organization in the past and are thus referred to as Prospects by the 
organization.  Some of these Prospects (10,077) have made financial donations in the past to the 
organization, but these individuals were not considered members because their donation was 
either a) to an affiliated entity such as the organization’s PAC or 527
11; or b) too small to be 
considered a member.  Membership to the organization in 2008 usually requires a donation of at 
least $35.  Donors making gifts below this level are not considered members for fundraising 
purposes.  During typical membership drives, these non-donors and sub-$35 donors are 
requested to become a “member” of the organization by giving a gift of at least $35.  The only 
additional tangible benefit to “membership” for the individual is the receipt of a quarterly 
magazine which is not emphasized during the membership process.  The organization mainly 
promotes the psychic or altruistic benefits of membership. 
The usual communications between the organization and their email list consist of three 
primary types of activities: 1) fundraising appeals which request financial contributions and 
                                                      
11 A PAC (political action committee) or 527 represent two different legal representations of the nonprofit that allow 
for different activities, mostly related to electioneering, for the nonprofit.  Each legal entity is considered separate 
and must perform their own fundraising and email list building activities. 
- 10 - emanate from the fundraising department; 2) action alerts, surveys, and event invitations which 
request non-financial contributions of time and emanate from the policy department; and 3) 
education or other general notifications which are informational in purpose and come from the 
policy or communications department.  Requests for contributions of time to support the 
lobbying efforts of the organization represent a large majority of the communications.  These 
emails notify the list subscribers of some situation that the charitable organization believes is 
important to their constituency and ask the subscribers to take “action.”  Typically “action” 
involves a 10-15 minute process whereby the member visits a page on the charitable 
organization’s website and personalizes a letter for emailing or faxing to one or more of their 
elected officials.  Approximately 268,504 list subscribers had donated time in the 12 months 
prior to the experiment.  
In our experiment, we therefore carefully take the donation history of individuals into 
account and differentiate between time-donors (alternatively referred to as activists in the 
language of the organization) and money-donors. 
Our experiment involved three treatments for which we divided the pool of Prospects into 
three equally-sized groups.  Table 1 describes the demographic breakdown of the three groups 
based on information collected from a subset of the sample during previous surveys.
12 Table 2 
summarizes the past behavior of the three prospect groups.  All characteristics balance across the 
three treatments.  For example, past money donors are evenly divided across the three groups in 
terms of number (1.35%), average conditional donations ($88.30), and number of past donations 
(1.37).  The “Messaging and Time-Donation (Action) Behavior” rows describe the 
communication relationship between the charitable organization and the individual.  On average 
the organizations sends 62 messages per year to list subscribers and members make on average 
1.6 time donations in the form of actions.  Finally, the table describes the activist (time donor) 
breakdown of the three groups.  Activists are described within the organization as being 1) Super 
Activist if they made more than 4 time donations in the last 12 months; 2) Active if they made 1-
3 time donations in the last 12 months, joined the email list within the past 6 months, or attended 
an offline event for the organization in the past year; or 3) Inactive if they do not meet either the 
                                                      
12 While the demographic makeup of the list based on survey participation may be biased due to survey selection 
issues, it can be used to demonstrate the identical nature of the three groups since selection into the three groups was 
done orthogonally to any survey participation variable. 
- 11 - criteria for Super Activist or Active.  As Table 2 shows, the three activist groups are evenly 
divided across the three treatment groups.  For the remainder of this analysis we will combine 
the Super Activist and Active groups into a single group of time donors. 
The experiment consisted of sending three sequential fundraising emails to the 
experimental pool.  Each email consisted of identical language with the exception of the 
treatment language, which appeared in three different places in the email.  If an email recipient 
clicked on any of the links in the email, they were taken to an online donation page that 
reinforced the treatment language.  At this point in the process, the individuals decided whether 
to enter their donation amount, credit card information, and submit a donation or abandon the 
process and not make a financial contribution.  The general theme of the appeal was to ask 
Prospects to become a member within the next few days to support the organizations general 
outreach and education work in the 2008 general election (approximately 90 days in the future).   
The first email was sent on a Sunday (day 1), the second email was sent on the following 
Thursday (day 4), and the third email a week later on the next Thursday (day 11).  The first two 
emails urged members to become a member by day 4 midnight.  The third email extended the 
deadline to midnight on day 12.  Prospects who donated any positive amount were removed from 
subsequent mailings.  Treatment language did not vary across the three messages within each 
treatment or control group.  Results are aggregated across the three messages for the treatment 
and control groups.  
The three groups of Prospects were approached with the following donation requests: 
•  Control:    “Become an [organization] member with a gift of $35 or more.” 
•  Treatment 1:   “Become an [organization] member with a gift of $25 or more.” 
•  Treatment 2:   “Become an [organization] member with a gift of $25 or more – that's a 
$10 discount off our normal membership.” 
Given that none of these Prospects had been members before, it is reasonable to assume 
that those who were offered the $25 membership were not aware that the price was normally 
$35.  The donation landing page reinforced this by stating “Minimum membership” next to the 
$35 or $25 donation level for the Control and Treatment 1 group, respectively.  In Treatment 2, 
- 12 - the phrase “Special $10 Discount on Minimum Membership” appeared next to the $25 donation 
level. 
In all treatments, the webpage included radio buttons from among which donors could 
select when making a donation. The ask strings for the treatments were as follows: 
•  Control:      $35, $50, $75, $100, $250, $500, Other 
•  Treatment 1 and 2:   $25, $50, $75, $100, $250, $500, Other 
The “Other” radio button had a text box into which donors could write any number they wanted 
above $10. These ask strings mimic the strings typically used by the organization in 
fundraising.
13   
Finally, all donors in any group who made a gift of $20 or more were given the option to 
receive a branded picture frame. The language for the second sequential email stated “If you 
donate before midnight, we'll send you a magnetic picture frame as our gift.”  The language for 
the other two messages was similar. Donors who did not want the frame could check a box at the 
bottom of the donation page stating: “Please don’t send a frame: use my full donation to fight for 
[cause].” 
 
IV.  Experimental Results 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for our experimental treatments. Throughout this 
section, we discuss four different indicators: 1) “Response Rate” is the total number of donors 
conditional on being solicited (in %); 2) “Dollars given, unconditional” are the average dollars of 
all gifts for all solicited Prospects; 3) “Dollars given, conditional on giving” are the average 
dollars of all contributions conditional on giving; 4) “% who said “no frame” is the percent of 
donors who checked the box at the bottom of the donation page to not receive the picture frame.  
For example, Table 3 shows that we contacted 231,183 subjects in the control treatment, of 
                                                      
13 Ideally, we would have liked to offer identical ask strings for all treatments. However, the charity did not want to 
have a $25 ask in the $35 membership treatment (Control), as this was thought to confuse potential donors. Donors 
who wanted to make a contribution less than indicated by the minimum radio button, therefore had to choose the 
“other” option. This option to make a donation less than the minimum threshold was used by 3.8% of donors in the 
control (where the minimum button was $35), while 1.1% (1.7%) used this option in Treatment 1 (Treatment 2) 
where the minimum button was $25. Overall, the “Other” box was used 5%, 4.5% and 3.9% in the Control, 
Treatment 1, and Treatment 2, respectively. 
- 13 - which 521 decided to give which corresponds to a response rate of 0.23%.  Those donors 
contributed an average of $45.21 and 62.2% (324 donors) requested not to receive the picture 
frame.  In total, our study raised $77,026 from 1,691 individuals across the three treatments.
14   
 
Decreasing Minimum Donation Level 
As stated in the introduction, we establish a baseline for the effect on membership 
demand from dropping the membership minimum threshold without announcing a discount.   
This will allow us later to disentangle the price and quality effects in the discount treatment.  
Comparing the Control and Treatment 1 in Table 3 shows that a reduction of the minimum level 
from $35 to $25 leaves the response rate unchanged at 0.23%, while the conditional 
contributions decrease from $45.21 to $36.32.  This immediately leads to the following result: 
Result 1:  A change in the donation threshold for obtaining membership decreases average 
unconditional and conditional contributions, while the participation rate remains unaffected. 
Further evidence for this result can be seen in regression 1 from Tables 4, 5, and 6.  Table 
4 (regression 1) shows that the difference in the participation rate for donors in Treatment 1 
relative to the Control is statistically insignificant.  However, the conditional donation amount 
was approximately $9 lower (Table 5 regression 1) and thus the unconditional contribution 
amount was statistically significantly lower by $0.02/Prospect (Table 6).   
These results provide an empirical answer to the theoretically ambiguous effects 
described in Hypothesis 1: conditional contributions decrease with a decrease in the threshold.  A 
$10 decrease in the threshold produces a $9 drop in the conditional donation.  Mapped to the 
theory, this suggests that many donors are operating in Region II of their demand curve (as 
illustrated in Figure 1), i.e. contribute at the threshold level.  However, given that the conditional 
donation averages approximately $10 above the threshold, there are also donors in both treatment 
groups donating above this threshold and thus operating in Region I of their demand curve.
15   
                                                      
14 In the empirical analysis, we exclude one donor in Treatment 1 who made a donation of $10,000.  Given that it is 
unlikely that this gift resulted from the specifics of Treatment 1, the gift was eliminated.  The largest gift after this 
was a $1000 gift in Treatment 1; 3 $500 gifts in Treatment 2; and a $365 gift in the Control.  All other gifts were at 
or below $250. 
15 In the Control (Treatment1, Treatment2), 36.7% (26.5%, 25.4%) of donors give above the threshold; the 
differences between the Control and Treatment 1/Treatment 2 are statistically significant at the 0.5% level. 
- 14 - These results already suggest an interaction between price and perceived quality of the 
charity.  Changing the donation threshold does not change the response rate between the two 
treatments.  As described by the theory, this could be because (i) the willingness-to-pay for 
membership is greater than either of the thresholds used in this study for most of the treatment 
group; or (ii) lowering the minimum donation threshold does not induce more subjects to give 
because it simultaneously reduces the willingness-to-pay.  This later effect would indicate an 
interaction between price and perceived quality (i.e., willingness-to-pay).  A second observation 
that supports the presence of a price-quality interaction as described in Hypothesis 1 is shown by 
the fact that a significantly larger fraction of donations are above the threshold in the Control 
treatment (36.7% above $35) than in Treatment 1 (26.5% above $25).  If there were no 
interaction effect, this relationship should be reversed.  
In terms of the theoretical model, this suggests that – for some subjects – the higher 
threshold resulted in an increase in their utility-maximizing donation amount, or 
. 
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Effect of a Special Discount 
With this impact of a price change now characterized, we can consider the role of a price 
discount as implemented in Treatment 2.  A comparison with the Control corresponds to the pure 
price effect of our theory, a comparison with Treatment 1 to the quality effect. Table 3 supports 
Hypothesis 2 by showing that under the discount treatment we observed an increased response 
rate compared to both Control and Treatment 1 (0.27% in Treatment 2 vs. 0.23% in Control and 
Treatment 1). The conditional donations in Treatment 2, however, are smaller than in the Control 
treatment ($37.94 vs. $45.21), but almost identical to those in Treatment 1 ($36.32).  This leads 
us to formulate the following result on the pure price effect: 
Result 2: Framing a lower membership threshold as a discount from a given standard level 
decreases conditional donations, but increases the participation rate such that average 
unconditional donations are stable. 
 
Unconditionally, 0.083% (0.060%, 0.068%) gave above the threshold in the Control (Treatment 1, Treatment 2).  
The difference between the Control and Treatment 1 (Treatment 2) is statistically significant at the 0.5% (10%) 
level; whereas, the difference between Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 is not statistically different. 
- 15 - Further evidence for Result 2 can be found in the first regression in Tables 4, 5 and 6. 
The response rate for Treatment 2 is statistically significantly greater than for either the Control 
or Treatment 1 (1% level of significance).  Specifically, introducing the discount causes the 
response rate to increase by 0.04 percentage points above a baseline of 0.24% (see baseline 
observed probability in Table 4).  That is, discounting the charitable membership price by 29% 
triggered an increase in participation of 18%. However, the reduction in conditional donations 
(significant at 1%), leads to an insignificant change in average unconditional contributions 
(Table 6).  
This result is consistent with our theoretical model: the response rate is predicted to 
increase if the utility-maximizing gift for many Prospects at the high threshold is zero (i.e., 
 at  ), but positive with a $10 discount (i.e., 
 at  ).  That is, the result indicates that the quality signal in the 
discount treatment maybe determined by  .   
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Comparing the discount Treatment 2 to Treatment 1 (i.e. considering the quality effect), 
we see that the unconditional amount raised per Prospect in Treatment 2 is statistically larger as 
more donors give (significant at 5% in Table 4 and 6, respectively) while conditional 
contributions are equivalent between these two treatments.  
The results, therefore, suggest that it is beneficial to frame a given minimum donation 
level as a discount from a higher level. Going to the lower minimum level without framing it as a 
discount may decrease conditional donations, but does not increase the participation rate.   
Alternatively, a price discount appears to increase the participation rate while showing no effect 
on the unconditional donation rate, thus making their use beneficial. In the long-term, the relative 
benefits (Control vs. Treatment 2) depend on the future donation behavior of the additionally 
attracted donors which is beyond the scope of the current paper.  
 
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
We now explore the potential benefits from using discounts in charitable fundraising at a 
deeper level, that is, if this mechanism has particular benefits for specific subsets of prospects.  
For this, we differentiate our subject pool by means of their previous interaction with the charity; 
- 16 - in particular, if they have donated time or money in the past.  We denote past time donors as 
Active/Activists with Inactive being those who did not donate time in the past. Past money 
donors are denoted by M-Donor while NoM-Donor describes those who did not donate money in 
the past.
16   
Our analysis thus far has not shown a significant change in gross income (unconditional 
contributions) to the charity from using a price discount (Treatment 2 vs. control).  Splitting the 
sample based on previous interactions, Table 6, regression (4) shows important differences for 
the treatment effect: while unconditional donations do not change for NoM-Donors, they do 
decrease for donors who gave time and money in the past ($0.39 lower), but increase for money 
donors who were inactive ($0.30 higher). 
A charity could therefore profit by differentiating its fundraising strategy based on 
knowledge of previous Prospect interactions. That is, while money donors who did not give time 
should be contacted via the discount treatment, the charity could lose money by contacting 
money donors who had given time with the discount treatment. 
Result 3:  An optimal fundraising strategy differentiates fundraising mechanisms by donor types. 
That is, the charity should exploit information on if and how (money or time) subjects have 
contributed in the past.  
Result 3 establishes the benefits from targeted fundraising.  We now study the causes of 
the differences across donor types in a more detailed way.  For this, we again consider the effects 
on participation (Table 4) and conditional contributions (Table 5). We first consider former time 
donors (activists) regardless their previous money donations.  Regression 2 from Tables 4 and 5 
show that former time donors contribute under the discount treatment at a higher rate (0.035 
percentage points higher), but with a lower conditional donation amount ($9.77 lower).  This 
effect is primarily driven by those time donors who did not give money in the past 
(Active*NoM-Donor). This can be seen from regression 4 in Tables 4 and 5.  While the 
conditional donation results for activists appear invariant to subdividing them by past money 
donations ($8.04 and $9.78 lower for Active*M-Donor and Active*NoM-Donor, respectively) 
only activists who have not donated money exhibit a statistically significant increase in response 
                                                      
16 As a sensitivity analysis, we also considered using actual past donation amount instead of the binary M-
Donor/NoM-Donor and found the results robust to either specification. 
- 17 - rate for the discount offer (0.039 percentage point increase).  As a result, the unconditional 
donation amount (regression 4 from Table 6) for the discount offer is statistically 
indistinguishable for activists who are not money donors and statistically lower ($0.39 lower) for 
activists who are money donors.   
Different results prevail for subjects who did not donate time in the past (Inactive).   
These Prospects do not exhibit an elevated participation rate for Treatment 2 like their active 
counterparts.  Also unlike their active counterparts, the conditional contribution of inactives is 
higher in Treatment 2 than Treatment 1 and statistically indistinguishable from the Control 
(regression 2, Table 5).  This is consistent with the discussion above regarding repeated 
interaction between charity and donor.  Whereas activists may consider the discount to be a 
“thank you” for previous action, inactives have done nothing to warrant a “thank you” from the 
charity and thus may view the discount as a gift that should be reciprocated.  As a result, 
inactives donate at a higher conditional contribution level than actives when presented with the 
discount.  This inactive effect with respect to the response rate and conditional donation is 
invariant across both subgroups of inactive past money donors and inactives who have not 
donated in the past.   
Turning to past money donors, we focus on those who have only interacted with the 
charity along the single dimension of money (i.e., no time donations).  Relative to the Control 
treatment, we observe an increase in the response rate (0.021 percentage point) and conditional 
contribution amount ($12.20 increase) for these inactive M-donors in Treatment 2, though 
neither are statistically significant.  As a consequence, inactive M-Donors were the only group to 
donate unconditionally more at a significant level in the discount treatment relative to the control 
($0.30/prospect more).   
We summarize these results as follows: 
Result 4:  The effect of framing a lower threshold level on participation and donation levels 
differs depending on the dimension of past donations (time or money).  Specifically, 
(i) Past time-donors who had not given money before respond to the discount at a higher rate 
and lower conditional gift leaving the unconditional donation level unchanged.  
- 18 - (ii) Time-donors who also gave money in the past react to a discount on membership with a 
marginally lower conditional gift, but no change in response rate relative to the control, such 
that unconditional contributions decrease. 
(iii) Past money-donors who did not give time respond to a discount with positive (but 
insignificant) increases in both participation and conditional contributions such that 
unconditional gift are significantly increased.   
(iv) Prospects who had interacted with the charity along neither a time nor money dimension are 
unaffected by the discount treatment relative to the control. 
Taken together, Result 3 and 4 suggests that a charity can benefit from offering the 
discount treatment to those prospects who have interacted with the charity in only one 
dimension, i.e., past inactive money donors and past active non-money donors. For the former an 
immediate increase in contributions results while for the latter the benefit potentially is given by 
an enlarged donor pool.  The charity would do no harm to offer the discount to those prospects 
who had never interacted with the charity. 
These differences in behavior are consistent with Hypothesis 3: time-donors may see the 
discount as a “thank you” for previous actions and therefore decrease their (conditional) 
contributions, while this “thank you” interpretation does not apply to non-donors. Furthermore, 
past money-donors react differently to the discount which uses the same (monetary) dimension 
as the initial donation.  
These findings indicate that for the analysis of repeated reciprocal relationships it is 
necessary to comprehensively analyze exchanges in the different dimensions of the commodity 
space (money, time, consumption goods).  It is therefore important for charities to keep track of 
all former interactions with potential donors:  the value of “warm-lists” to a charity stems from 
the potential to discriminate future solicitation attempts based on the whole history of 
interactions. Traditionally, a “warm list” is defined as a group of people who have made at least 
one past contribution to the charity, agnostic to the specifics of the past contribution.  Given the 
results described above, we therefore formulate the following definition of an “augmented warm 
list”: 
- 19 - Definition:  An “augmented warm list” is a list of the contact information for those who have 
agreed to accept communications from the charity along with their historical time and/or money 
contributions to the charity. 
The benefits of an augmented warm list to a nonprofit are clearly delineated in the above 
discussion. Table 7 summarizes these effects for all treatments. From Table 4, we see that on 
average past time-donors contribute at a rate that is 2.6 times (0.41 percentage points above) the 
contribution rate of inactive donors.  Past money-donors contribute at a rate that is 14.5 times 
(3.05 percentage points above) the contribution rate of non-money donors.  The average 
unconditional donation of past time-donors is $0.18 greater than that of inactive donors (Table 
6).  Similarly, the average unconditional donation of past donors was $1.45 greater than that of 
non-donors.  Overall, we obtain the following result: 
Result 5:  Subjects on a warm list are more likely to contribute and give – on average – larger 
donations per contact than those not on the warm list.  Past money donors are more likely to 
donate money relative to past time donors.   
The analyses conducted here do not consider any temporal dimension to the augmented 
“warm list”. Intuition suggests that a donor whose last money or time donation lies more in the 
past is not as “warm” as a more current donor.  Exploring the lapse rate of a “warm list” is a 
subject of future research. 
 
Donor Quality 
The previous results provide strong evidence for the value that past donors to the charity 
have for future fundraising drives. For the long-run analysis, it is therefore important to see if the 
marginal donors attracted by the price discount will make future contributions at a frequency and 
magnitude relative to donors attracted in the Control treatment. Intuitively, enlarging the donor 
pool must come at a cost for the charity as individual motivations to give must be lower for the 
marginal donor. 
While a full analysis of donor quality can only be done through the long term analysis of 
donor behavior, we can gain insights into the “cost” and possible motivation of a donor based on 
their acceptance or rejection of the donation-conditional picture frame.  Table 3 indicates that the 
- 20 - fraction of donors who reject the gift is smaller in the discount treatment (56.2% compared to 
62.2% in the Control and 59.3% in Treatment 1).  Table 7 further indicates a larger rejection rate 
among past money and time donors in all treatments but one.  We formulate the following result: 
Result 6:  Warm list subjects do not only generate larger revenues to the charity by contributing 
more, but also generate less fundraising costs: the additional gift is the more likely to be turned 
down the more past donations (money/time) a subject has made.  The rejection rate of the gift is 
smaller if membership is framed as a discount. 
For all donors, the rejection rate of the frame averaged 59.1%.  Table 8 displays the 
marginal effects from a probit regression on the binary decision to accept the picture frame for 
various groups and treatments.  When the $25 minimum membership is framed as a discount, 
there is a statistically significant increase in the frame acceptance rate by 6.0 percentage points 
relative to the 41% acceptance level for the control.  Past activists were 7.1 percentage points 
more likely to accept the frame under the discount treatment relative to the control.  Similarly, 
those who had not donated money in the past were 6.5 percentage points more likely to accept 
the frame under the discount treatment.  Both of these results are statistically significant.  These 
results suggest that former time-donors joining the charity under the discount treatment might be 
of lower value to the charity.  In the short run, sending more gifts is costly to the charity.  In the 
long run, their future contributions will be decisive. 
Past money-donors are most beneficial to the charity. Not only do they contribute at a 
higher rate, they are also less likely to accept the additional gift.  Consistent with intuition, they 
are high quality donors as their motivation to help the charity (e.g., their public good utility or 
warm-glow) is manifested in the same dimension (money) as is requested by the charity.  As the 
charity attracts an increasing number of donors, the marginal donor has an increasingly lower 
intrinsic motivation to give and needs increasingly greater extrinsic incentives to give.   
 
The Effect of Political Environment 
Having established that fundraising mechanisms work different depending on time and 
money donation history, it is natural to check differences due to political environments since 
time donations are largely linked to actions addressing elected officials.  A link between political 
- 21 - voting patterns and the effectiveness of fundraising mechanisms was suggested by Karlan and 
List (2007). They find that a matching grant treatment was ineffective in Blue states, but quite 
effective in Red states.
17  
We therefore finally study the links between donation behavior and voting outcomes in 
the 2008 Presidential Elections. That is, Blue refers to states won by Barack Obama, while Red 
states are those won by John McCain.
18  The results of this analysis are presented in Table 9-11 
and show no significant difference in donation behavior linked to the political outcome if 
controlling for the specific donor types. That is, the donor types react similarly to the respective 
treatments in Blue and in Red states.  
These results indicate that observed differences in reactions to specific fundraising 
mechanisms at the state level could be driven by different compositions of donor types at the 
state level. While donor type characteristics are balanced for our study as shown in Table 12, any 
analysis of fundraising mechanisms with other charities might involve a different composition of 
donor types across states.
19 Our results call for a careful interpretation of aggregated effects in 
the literature, in particular when relying on smaller samples.  
 
V.  Conclusion   
We conducted an online natural field experiment with 702,890 subjects designed to 
analyze the charity membership as a fundraising instrument.  Due to the low cost and ease of use 
which allow for a much larger pool of experimental subjects than other experimental settings, we 
thereby propose using online fundraising platforms as a new and extremely beneficial way to 
conduct natural field experiments.  
We found that donation behavior is affected by the minimum donation level required for 
membership. Reducing the minimum donation threshold did not lead to more subjects donating, 
                                                      
17 They defined Blue and Red states relative to the 2004 Presidential Election outcome. Following popular 
terminology, Blue states are those won by the Democrat (here, John Kerry) and Red states are those won by the 
Republican (George W. Bush).   
18 Our results are invariant to defining Blue and Red according to the 2004 Presidential Election outcome.  Similarly 
our results do not change when we use actual vote percentages for the two candidates in lieu of blue/red dummy 
variables. 
19 For example, a charity may do political organizing in particular states to combat ballot measures which might 
result in a higher percentage of Actives in some subset of states. 
- 22 - but to lower average donations. While such a reduction is thereby extremely costly to the charity, 
we showed that by framing the reduction as a special discount the reduction in conditional 
contributions can be offset by attracting more donors.  
These general findings suggest that the use of discounts as a charitable organization 
marketing instrument can be beneficial. Our results are consistent with the economic literature 
relating prices to quality: a charity that requires a larger donation to become a member appears to 
be signaling that it is a higher quality charity and thus membership has a higher value to the 
individual.  In addition, our results suggest that there is a range of thresholds such that the charity 
can increase the threshold without reducing the response rate.  Identifying the optimal threshold 
and whether that threshold is specific to a particular charity is beyond the scope of this 
experiment but appears to be warranted given our results. 
This analysis also highlights for the first time the important distinction between donor 
types (financial or volunteer) and their differing reaction to fundraising mechanisms.  This 
suggests that not only is there value in having a warm-list of previous donors, but also in 
denoting the nature of past donations as either money and/or time donors.  Our results show that 
charities could benefit from differentiating fundraising mechanism across donor types.  The 
differing effects of discounts on past time vs. money donors furthermore indicate that it is 
important to understand fundraising as a multi-dimensional activity.  A full understanding of the 
economics of charities can only be achieved if different modes of giving as well as their 
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All 702,890 231,183 236,234 235,473
1 Gender (% Female) 60.9% 61.1% 60.9% 60.8%
2 Age 42.7 (14.6) 42.7 (14.6) 42.7 (14.5) 42.8 (14.6)
>25 10.3% 10.4% 10.3% 10.3%
25‐35 35.4% 35.5% 35.3% 35.5%
35‐50 21.3% 21.3% 21.4% 21.3%
50+ 32.9% 32.8% 32.9% 32.9%
3P a r t y  Affiliation
Democrat 73.5% 73.5% 73.2% 73.8%
Republican 3.6% 3.3% 4.0% 3.4%
Other 22.9% 23.2% 22.8% 22.7%
4 Ethnicity
White 84.7% 84.1% 84.9% 84.9%
African American 2.6% 2.6% 2.4% 2.6%
Hispanic 5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 5.2%
Other 7.7% 8.2% 7.6% 7.2%
5 Relationship Status
Single 37.6% 38.2% 37.0% 37.7%
Married 11.5% 11.3% 11.4% 11.7%
Partnered / Civil Unions 48.2% 47.9% 48.7% 48.1%
Other 2.7% 2.6% 2.9% 2.5%
6R e g i o n
Midwest 21.4% 21.3% 21.5% 21.5%
Northeast 21.4% 21.5% 21.5% 21.2%
South 29.2% 29.1% 29.1% 29.3%
West 28.0% 28.2% 27.9% 28.0%
72 0 0 4  Election (% Living in Blue State) 57.4% 57.6% 57.4% 57.3%
2008 Election (% Living in Blue State) 78.2% 78.3% 78.1% 78.1%  
Note: not all information reported above is available for every prospect.  Specifically Gender is 
available for 54% of file; Age 28.2%; Party Affiliation 1.5%; Ethnicity 1%; Relationship Status 
1.5%; Region 77%.  Numbers in parentheses are standard deviation. 
 






1T i m e  on File (yrs) 2.38 (1.73) 2.37 (1.73) 2.38 (1.73) 2.38 (1.73)
Money Donor Behavior
2%  Previous Money Donors 1.35% 1.35% 1.36% 1.34%
3A v e r a g e  M‐Donation, cond on giving 88.3 (248.5) 91.2 (287.5) 85.9 (210.7) 87.8 (242.4)
4N o .  of M‐Donations, cond on giving 1.37 (0.954) 1.36 (0.873) 1.37 (1.01) 1.37 (0.976)
5M o n t h s  Since Last M‐Donation, cond on giving 18.8 (17.9) 18.3 (17.5) 18.9 (17.9) 19.2 (18.2)
6N o .  of M‐Donations, unconditional 0.0184 (0.192) 0.0182 (0.186) 0.0186 (0.197) 0.0183 (0.193)
7A v e r a g e  M‐Donation, unconditional 1.19 (30.6) 1.23 (35.0) 1.16 (26.5) 1.17 (29.8)
Messaging and Time‐Donation (Action) Behavior
8N o .  of Msgs/yr 62.2 (32.5) 62.2 (32.4) 62.3 (32.7) 62.1 (32.3)
9N o .  of Time‐Donations (Actions)/yr 1.64 (2.90) 1.64 (2.88) 1.64 (2.92) 1.65 (2.90)
10 No. Msgs/yr, cond on 1+ Action 66.06 (27.1) 66.0 (26.8) 66.1 (27.4) 66.0 (27.1)
11 No. T‐Donations/yr, cond on 1+ Action 2.36 (3.22) 2.35 (3.20) 2.36 (3.24) 2.37 (3.22)
12 No. Msgs to M‐Donors/yr 81.8 (44.0) 82.0 (45.4) 82.1 (44.0) 81.2 (42.8)
13 No. Actions from M‐Donors/yr 2.89 (3.73) 2.85 (3.68) 3.00 (3.84) 2.83 (3.66)
14 Activist (T‐Donor) Category
Super Active (4+ time donations/yr) 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Active (1‐3 time donations/yr) 34.2% 34.3% 34.3% 34.1%
Inactive (0 time donations/yr) 61.8% 61.7% 61.7% 61.9%  
Note:  Activist Category is available for 100% of prospect file. 
 







Response rate 0.23% 0.23% 0.27%
Dollars given, unconditional 0.10 0.08 0.10
Dollars given, conditional on giving 45.21 36.30 37.94
% who said "no frame" 62.2% 59.3% 56.2%
observations 231,183 236,234 235,473
donors 521 536 633  
 
 
- 27 - Table 4: Probit, marginal effects (dependent variable=donated (binary)) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) Add'l Tests
1T 1  (d) 1.616e‐05 (1) ≠ (2)***
[1.468e‐04]
2T 2  (d) 4.355e‐04***
[1.497e‐04]
3T 1 * A c t i v e  (d) 7.417e‐05 (3) ≠ (4)**
[1.250e‐04]
4T 2 * A c t i v e  (d) 3.514e‐04***
[1.363e‐04]
5T 1 * I n a c t i v e  (d) ‐2.205e‐04 (5) ≠ (6)**
[1.980e‐04]
6T 2 * I n a c t i v e  (d) 2.684e‐04
[2.176e‐04]
7A c t i v e  (d) 4.111e‐03***
[2.986e‐04]
8T 1 * M ‐Donor (d) 6.640e‐06 (8) = (9)
[4.146e‐04]
9T 2 * M ‐Donor (d) ‐3.252e‐05
[4.103e‐04]




























Baseline Obs Prob 2.40E‐03 1.60E‐03 2.10E‐03 1.40E‐03
Observations 702,890 702,890 702,890 702,890
Psuedo R‐squared 4.922e‐04 5.542e‐02 4.272e‐02 9.165e‐02
Marginal effects; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
- 28 - Table 5: OLS (dependent variable=conditional contribution) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) Add'l Tests
1T 1  (d) ‐8.914*** (1) = (2)
[2.455]
2T 2  (d) ‐7.271***
[2.361]
3T 1 * A c t i v e  (d) ‐9.295*** (3) = (4)
[2.716]
4T 2 * A c t i v e  (d) ‐9.765***
[2.634]
5T 1 * I n a c t i v e  (d) ‐7.225 (5) ≠ (6)*
[5.719]
6T 2 * I n a c t i v e  (d) 2.759
[5.279]
7A c t i v e  (d) 0.985
[4.367]
8T 1 * M ‐Donor (d) ‐13.01** (8) ≠ (9)*
[5.711]
9T 2 * M ‐Donor (d) ‐3.312
[5.755]




























24 Constant 45.21*** 44.42*** 44.23*** 43.93***
[1.748] [3.907] [1.934] [4.347]
Observations 1690 1690 1690 1690
R‐squared 0.00767 0.0109 0.00964 0.0111
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
- 29 - Table 6: OLS (dependent variable=unconditional contribution amount) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) Add'l Tests
1T 1  (d) ‐0.0195** (1) ≠ (2)**
[0.00808]
2T 2  (d) 0.000101
[0.00809]
3T 1 * A c t i v e  (d) ‐0.0367*** (3) ≠ (4)*
[0.0131]
4T 2 * A c t i v e  (d) ‐0.0124
[0.0131]
5T 1 * I n a c t i v e  (d) ‐0.00912 (5) ≠ (6)*
[0.0103]
6T 2 * I n a c t i v e  (d) 0.00839
[0.0103]
7A c t i v e  (d) 0.182***
[0.0118]
8T 1 * M ‐Donor (d) ‐0.399*** (8) ≠ (9)***
[0.0694]
9T 2 * M ‐Donor (d) ‐0.118*
[0.0697]




























24 Constant 0.102*** 0.0324*** 0.0824*** 0.0261***
[0.00574] [0.00731] [0.00578] [0.00733]
Observations 702890 702890 702890 702890
R‐squared 8.3E‐06 8.5E‐04 0.00289 0.00403
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  







Response rate 0.47% 0.49% 0.57%
Dollars given, unconditional 0.21 0.18 0.20
Dollars given, conditional on giving 45.41 36.11 35.64
% who said "no frame" 62.8% 59.8% 55.8%
observations 88,444 90,595 89,614
donors 417 445 507
Cross Section B: No past time donation (Inactives)
Response rate 0.07% 0.06% 0.09%
Dollars given, unconditional 0.03 0.02 0.04
Dollars given, conditional on giving 44.42 37.20 47.18
% who said "no frame" 59.6% 57.1% 57.9%
observations 142,739 145,639 145,859
donors 104 91 126
Cross Section C: Past Money‐Donors
Response rate 3.08% 3.09% 3.05%
Dollars given, unconditional 1.53 1.13 1.41
Dollars given, conditional on giving 49.57 36.57 46.26
% who said "no frame" 65.6% 65.7% 63.5%
observations 3,112 3,202 3,147
donors 96 99 96
Cross Section D: Not Past Money‐Donors
Response rate 0.19% 0.19% 0.23%
Dollars given, unconditional 0.08 0.07 0.08
Dollars given, conditional on giving 44.23 36.24 36.45
% who said "no frame" 61.4% 57.9% 54.9%
observations 228,071 233,032 232,326
donors 425 437 537  
- 31 - Table 8.  Probit, mfx (dependent variable=accept conditional gift (picture frame)) 
(1) (2) (3) Add'l Tests
1T 1  (d) 2.900e‐02 (1) = (2)
[3.054e‐02]
2T 2  (d) 5.979e‐02**
[2.931e‐02]
3T 1 * A c t i v e  (d) 3.113e‐02 (3) = (4)
[3.396e‐02]
4T 2 * A c t i v e  (d) 7.077e‐02**
[3.295e‐02]
5T 1 * I n a c t i v e  (d) 2.478e‐02 (5) = (6)
[7.128e‐02]
6T 2 * I n a c t i v e  (d) 1.683e‐02
[6.562e‐02]
7A c t i v e ‐3.279e‐02
[5.460e‐02]
8T 1 * M ‐Donor (d) ‐3.334e‐04 (8) = (9)
[7.183e‐02]
9T 2 * M ‐Donor (d) 2.188e‐02
[7.285e‐02]






Baseline Obs Prob 4.09E‐01 4.09E‐01 4.09E‐01
Observations 1690 1690 1690
Pseudo R‐squared 1.841e‐03 2.175e‐03 4.083e‐03
Marginal effects; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Standard errors in brackets; * sig at 10%; ** sig at 5%; *** sig at 1%  
- 32 - Table 9.  Probit, marginal effects (dependent variable=donated (binary)) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Active M‐Donor Active*NoM‐Donor InActive*M‐Donor InActive*NonM‐Donor
T1 (d) 7.193e‐03 ‐7.528e‐05 ‐8.529e‐03* ‐4.323e‐05
[7.549e‐03] [3.891e‐04] [4.686e‐03] [1.469e‐04]
T2 (d) ‐1.138e‐03 1.007e‐03** 1.509e‐03 1.394e‐04
[7.436e‐03] [4.002e‐04] [4.840e‐03] [1.503e‐04]
C*Red (d) 4.808e‐04 ‐8.837e‐04* ‐2.738e‐04 1.079e‐04
[1.196e‐02] [5.303e‐04] [7.544e‐03] [2.428e‐04]
T1*Red (d) ‐8.655e‐03 ‐1.339e‐04 3.638e‐03 2.807e‐05
[9.927e‐03] [5.698e‐04] [1.039e‐02] [2.350e‐04]
T2*Red (d) ‐1.695e‐03 ‐6.231e‐04 ‐4.315e‐04 1.198e‐04
[1.176e‐02] [4.960e‐04] [7.452e‐03] [2.243e‐04]
Baseline Obs Prob 4.22E‐02 4.58E‐03 1.35E‐02 7.89E‐04
Observations 5595 240655 3826 290946
R‐squared 9.479e‐04 1.120e‐03 8.906e‐03 8.458e‐04
Test T1=T2 T1 = T2 T1 ≠ T2*** T1 ≠ T2** T1 = T2
Marginal effects; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Table 10. OLS (dependent variable=conditional contribution amount) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Active M‐Donor Active*NoM‐Donor InActive*M‐Donor InActive*NonM‐Donor
T1 (d) ‐14.31*** ‐8.021** ‐6.562 ‐8.767
[4.320] [3.280] [30.03] [10.02]
T2 (d) ‐7.408 ‐10.02*** ‐7.648 ‐3.083
[4.547] [3.115] [23.54] [9.477]
C*Red (d) ‐0.475 ‐4.496 ‐9.687 ‐4.921
[7.177] [5.309] [38.77] [14.54]
T1*Red (d) 1.836 ‐5.411 ‐16.88 2.963
[7.060] [4.904] [46.96] [15.33]
T2*Red (d) ‐3.782 ‐3.730 103.0*** 7.994
[7.403] [4.589] [38.16] [13.11]
Constant 50.48*** 45.36*** 48.44*** 45.80***
[3.189] [2.324] [17.34] [7.018]
Observations 237 1110 54 231
R‐squared 0.0331 0.0103 0.0579 ‐0.0160
Test T1=T2 T1 = T2 T1 = T2 T1 = T2 T1 = T2
Marginal effects; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
- 33 - Table 11.  OLS (dependent variable=unconditional contribution amount) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Active M‐Donor Active*NoM‐Donor InActive*M‐Donor InActive*NonM‐Donor
T1 (d) ‐0.321 ‐0.0381* ‐0.447 ‐0.00799
[0.367] [0.0208] [0.459] [0.00970]
T2 (d) ‐0.351 ‐0.00757 ‐0.0494 0.00365
[0.369] [0.0209] [0.453] [0.00969]
C*Red (d) 0.00399 ‐0.0543* ‐0.169 0.000554
[0.590] [0.0311] [0.722] [0.0150]
T1*Red (d) ‐0.274 ‐0.0276 ‐0.0757 0.00309
[0.573] [0.0307] [0.684] [0.0148]
T2*Red (d) ‐0.214 ‐0.0432 1.768** 0.0138
[0.587] [0.0308] [0.746] [0.0148]
Constant 2.068*** 0.200*** 0.781** 0.0340***
[0.261] [0.0148] [0.326] [0.00689]
Observations 5595 240655 3826 290946
R‐squared ‐0.000504 0.0000182 0.00104 ‐0.00000495




Table 12.  Composition of Blue and Red State List Members 
Blue States Active Inactive Totals
M‐Donor 1.1% 0.7% 1.8%
Non M‐Donor 43.9% 54.3% 98.2%
Totals 45.0% 55.0%
Red States Active Inactive Totals
M‐Donor 0.9% 0.7% 1.6%
Non M‐Donor 46.4% 52.0% 98.4%
Totals 47.3% 52.7%  
 
- 34 - Figure 1.  The solid line represents an individual’s demand curves based on one specific membership 
signal.  As the charity announces a higher threshold for receiving the membership benefit (T), the 
individual adjusts their beliefs about the expected value of the membership and thus operates along the 
demand curve depicted by the dotted line (i.e.,  ii mm ′ ≥ ).   
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